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PEOPLE V. HARNETT
I.

INTRODUCTION

When faced with the risk of losing one’s own life and liberty, a plea bargain
provides a defendant with reasonable certainty of the outcome and sentence as
opposed to the uncertainty, risk, and gamble that exists in pursuing a trial.1 The U.S.
Constitution provides defendants with critical protections, including the right to due
process.2 Pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, due process requires that a defendant
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter his plea agreement.3 In exchange for
the certainty of a sentence pursuant to a plea bargain, a defendant waives several
fundamental constitutional rights, including the right to a trial by jury, the right to
confront his or her accusers, the right to raise a defense, and the right to assistance of
counsel.4 In New York, a defendant may also be required as part of his plea agreement
to waive his right to appeal the sentence.5
New York court sentencing judges must exercise sound judicial discretion with
respect to plea agreements and should consider such factors as the “[i]ntegrity of the
criminal justice system in relation to the plea bargaining process as well as in relation
to its protective, retributive, deterrent and rehabilitative aspects.”6
A trial court has the constitutional duty to ensure that a defendant, before
pleading guilty, has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and its
consequences . . . . Although the court is not required to engage in any
particular litany when allocuting the defendant, due process requires that the
1.

People v. McConnell, 49 N.Y.2d 340, 346 (1980) (“[A] defendant who pleads guilty waives a number of
valuable constitutional rights in order to obtain reasonable assurance of certainty rather than gamble the
possibility of a not guilty verdict against the heavier punishment, the greater anxiety and, in some cases
at least, the greater expense, involved in a full trial.”). The Oscar-winning movie Heaven Can Wait
provides a poignant illustration of the dire consequences of making a decision based on incomplete
information. The film is about an angel who chooses certainty over chance for an individual he is
responsible for watching over. See Heaven Can Wait (Paramount Pictures 1978). Believing that the
film’s protagonist, Joe Pendelton (played by Warren Beatty), will meet his death in a horrifying and
painful head-on collision while biking through a mountain tunnel, the angel brings on Joe’s death
moments before the accident. Id. The angel elected the certainty of death over taking the chance that
Joe would severely suffer in the accident. Id. The angel’s belief that Joe would have been killed, however,
was faulty. In fact, Joe would have survived the accident and would not have been injured. Id. The
angel’s mistake led to troublesome consequences for the protagonist. Id. Like the angel in Heaven Can
Wait, who did not have the stomach to gamble the risk of Joe dying in a horrible accident, defendants
pursue similar opportunities in the plea bargain process in order to avoid the potential for “heavier
punishment, the greater anxiety and . . . the greater expense, involved in a full trial.” McConnell, 49
N.Y.2d at 346.

2.

U.S. Const. amend. V.

3.

Duperry v. Kirk, 563 F. Supp. 2d 370, 385 (D. Conn. 2008) (“It is axiomatic that a defendant pleading
guilty must do so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily in order to pass constitutional muster. That is
because, by pleading guilty, a defendant accepts significant consequences and waives several important
constitutional rights—namely, the right against self-incrimination, the right to confront one’s accusers,
and the right to a trial by jury.” (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969))).

4.

Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242 –44.

5.

People v. Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1, 5 (1989).

6.

McConnell, 49 N.Y.2d at 346.
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record must be clear that the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice
among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant . . . .7

In considering whether to accept a plea agreement, a defendant balances the
benefit of gaining certainty of his punishment obtained through a plea against the
risk of waiving several constitutional rights and the probability and likely outcome of
being found guilty at trial.8 It is axiomatic that the plea bargain process hinges on a
defendant having “a reasonable assurance of certainty” of the outcome of the plea
agreement.9 Additionally, sentencing conditions must be consistent with due process
requirements.10 Conditions associated with guilty pleas must “not amount to
overreaching or a denial of a defendant’s entitlement to fundamental fairness.”11 But
when a defendant enters into a plea bargain with incomplete information in violation
of his due process rights, he can assert that his plea bargain was invalid because it did
not meet fundamental due process requirements.12
In People v. Harnett, the New York Court of Appeals (the “Court of Appeals”)
held that David Harnett’s plea to the crime of sexual abuse in the first degree was
made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, even though he was not informed that
entering a plea would subject him to the provisions of New York’s Sex Offender
Management and Treatment Act (SOMTA) and potential civil confinement after
his prison term.13 The defendant, David M. Harnett (“Harnett”), asserted that the
trial court did not advise him of this prior to his plea, and therefore violated his right
to due process.14 SOMTA provides that a defendant could be subject to civil
7.

People v. Catu, 4 N.Y.3d 242, 245 (2005) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

8.

McConnell, 49 N.Y.2d at 346 (“[A] defendant who pleads guilty waives a number of valuable
constitutional rights in order to obtain reasonable assurance of certainty rather than gamble the
possibility of a not guilty verdict against the heavier punishment, the greater anxiety and, in some cases
at least, the greater expense, involved in a full trial.”). These constitutional rights include “[t]he privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment[,] . . . the right to trial by jury[,] . . . [and] the right to confront one’s
accusers.” 1 New York Criminal Practice § 12.07(5) (2d ed. 2011).

9.

McConnell, 49 N.Y.2d at 346; see also Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d at 7 (“The plea bargain . . . enables the parties
to avoid the delay and uncertainties of trial and appeal and permits swift certain punishment of law
violators with sentences tailored to the circumstances of the case at hand . . . .” (citations omitted)).

10.

See People v. Parker, 711 N.Y.S.2d 656, 661 (4th Dep’t 2000).

11.

People v. Miller, 434 N.Y.S.2d 36, 37 (2d Dep’t 1980) (finding that the defendant’s rights were not
violated after he accepted an offer for a concurrent sentence for two felony counts in exchange for a
withdrawal of an omnibus motion and entering a guilty plea).

12.

See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).

13.

See People v. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d 200 (2010). Though the specific charges and acts are not available,
pursuant to section 130.65 of New York Penal Law, sexual abuse in the first degree is defined as follows:
A person is guilty of sexual abuse in the first degree when he or she subjects another
person to sexual contact: 1. By forcible compulsion; or 2. When the other person is
incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless; or 3. When the other person
is less than eleven years old.
N.Y. Penal Law § 130.65 (McKinney 2011).

14.

Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 204.
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confinement or strict and intensive supervision after he has served a prison term for
a sex offense.15 The Court of Appeals concluded that the possibility of civil
confinement under SOMTA proceedings was a collateral and not a direct
consequence of Harnett’s plea and, therefore, that the trial court had no requirement
to disclose this to him in the plea bargain process.16 The Court of Appeals also
found that in this instance, notions of fundamental fairness did not apply because the
defendant did not make a factual showing that his lawyer did not disclose SOMTA
to him and that SOMTA would have been a critical factor in his decision to enter his
guilty plea.17
This case comment makes three contentions. First, the court incorrectly
concluded that SOMTA was a collateral consequence of entering a guilty plea to a
sex offense crime because the court ignored the language and intent of SOMTA,
which provides that criminal and civil proceedings for sex offenders are to follow an
“integrated approach.”18 Second, irrespective of the classification of the consequence
of SOMTA as either “collateral” or “direct,” the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in
Padilla v. Kentucky challenges the use of this categorical approach and raises
constitutional considerations in determining mandatory disclosures by a trial court to
criminal defendants.19 Third, the court’s consideration of fundamental fairness both
underestimates the potential severity and weight of SOMTA proceedings in a
defendant’s decision to enter a plea bargain and puts the onus on the defendant to
anticipate the impact of SOMTA as a consequence of his voluntary plea.20 Based on
these contentions, this case comment argues that the court incorrectly held that the
defendant’s plea in Harnett was valid and that the trial court did not violate his right
to due process. A defendant’s constitutional right to due process is violated when he
enters a guilty plea in exchange for a sentence without knowing that he potentially is
subject to such severe consequences, including the potential for indefinite civil
confinement or strict supervision, as a result of SOMTA’s proceedings.21
15.

See generally N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 10.01 (McKinney 2011).

16.

Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 206–08. The court rather strangely suggests that the defendant may have won his
argument had he “moved to withdraw his plea” by establishing that he did not know about SOMTA,
and that had he known about SOMTA, it “would have been a significant factor in the evaluation of a
plea bargain.” Id.

17.

Id. at 208.

18.

Mental Hyg. § 10.01(a).

19.

Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481–82 (2010).

20. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d. at 203–07.
21.

Id. at 206. “By pleading guilty, defendant exposed himself to the possibility that he would be confined
after expiration of his prison sentence, perhaps indefinitely.” Id. at 210 (Ciparick, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added); see also State v. Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d 644, 647 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2011) (“Involuntary civil
confinement [pursuant to Article 10] may entail indefinite confinement, [which] could be a more
intrusive exercise of state power than incarceration following a criminal conviction.” (alterations in
original) (internal quotation mark omitted) (citing Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v. Spitzer, No. 07 Civ.
2935 (GEL), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85163, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2007), aff ’d sub nom. Mental
Hygiene Legal Serv. v. Paterson, No. 07-5548-cv, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 4942 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 2009)));
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II. HARNETT’S PRODEDURAL HISTORY AND THE COURT’S RATIONALE

On March 13, 2008, the New York State Supreme Court, Schenectady County
(the “County Court”), issued a judgment against Harnett, convicting him of the
crime of sexual abuse in the first degree based on his plea of guilty.22 In exchange for
a guilty plea, Harnett waived his constitutional rights to due process, including the
right to a trial by jury, the right to confront his accusers, the right to raise a defense,
and the right to assistance of counsel.23 He also waived his right to appeal and was
sentenced to a seven-year prison term, with ten years of post-release supervision.24
The County Court also entered a fifteen-year order of protection in favor of the
victim. 25 Harnett appealed this judgment to the Supreme Court of New York,
Appellate Division, Third Department (the “Third Department”), contending that
his plea agreement should be invalid because he did not knowingly, intelligently, or
voluntarily enter the plea.26 Harnett asserted that the trial court did not advise him
prior to his plea that his admission to a sex offense conviction would automatically
subject him to the provisions of SOMTA. 27 SOMTA proceedings provide that
Harnett could be subject to civil confinement or strict and intensive supervision after
he has served his prison term.28 The Third Department concluded that the disclosure
of SOMTA proceedings was a collateral and not a direct consequence of his plea
and, therefore, the trial court had no obligation or requirement to disclose SOMTA
proceedings to Harnett in the plea bargain process. 29 The Third Department’s
conclusion was based on the finding that SOMTA proceedings were “entirely
separate from and independent of the original criminal action,” and that, because
factors specific to a defendant were in the SOMTA proceedings, it could not “be
reasonably said that the potential for the future civil confinement or intensive
supervision of defendant is an immediate, definite or automatic result of his guilty
plea.”30
Defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals on the grounds that he
did not enter into the plea agreement knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because
People v. Nieves, 896 N.Y.S.2d 644, 593 n.2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2010) (“Article 10 of the Mental
Hygiene Law, enacted by the Legislature in 2007, authorizes certain convicted sex offenders to be
subject to indefinite civil confinement in a secure mental health facility or indefinite strict and intensive
supervision and treatment in the community upon a finding by a jury that such an offender suffers from
a ‘Mental Abnormality’ as defined by the statute.”).
22.

People v. Harnett, 894 N.Y.S.2d 614, 615 (3d Dep’t 2010), aff ’d, 16 N.Y.3d 200 (2011).

23.

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242–44 (1969).

24.

Harnett, 894 N.Y.S.2d at 615.

25.

Id.

26. Id.
27.

Id.

28. Id.
29. Id. at 615–16.
30. Id. at 616.
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the trial court failed to disclose that he would be subject to SOMTA proceedings
before he entered his plea. 31 Under SOMTA, any person who is qualified as a
detained sex offender pursuant to New York Mental Hygiene Law section 10.03(g) is
subject to the provisions of the statute. 32 SOMTA proceedings provide that
individuals convicted of a sex offense could be subject to indefinite confinement or
strict and intensive supervision.33
Harnett argued that the trial court’s failure to inform him that he would be
subjected to SOMTA proceedings as a result of his conviction “invalidated his plea
because (1) they are direct consequences of the plea, and (2) whether direct or
31.

People v. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d 200, 204 (2011).

32.

Section 10.03(g) of the New York Mental Hygiene statute provides:
“Detained sex offender” means a person who is in the care, custody, control, or
supervision of an agency with jurisdiction, with respect to a sex offense or designated
felony, in that the person is either:
(1) A person who stands convicted of a sex offense as defined in subdivision (p) of this
section, and is currently serving a sentence for, or subject to supervision by the
division of parole, whether on parole or on post-release supervision, for such offense
or for a related offense;
(2) A person charged with a sex offense who has been determined to be an incapacitated
person with respect to that offense and has been committed pursuant to article
seven hundred thirty of the criminal procedure law, but did engage in the conduct
constituting such offense;
(3) A person charged with a sex offense who has been found not responsible by reason
of mental disease or defect for the commission of that offense;
(4) A person who stands convicted of a designated felony that was sexually motivated
and committed prior to the effective date of this article;
(5) A person convicted of a sex offense who is, or was at any time after September first,
two thousand five, a patient in a hospital operated by the office of mental health,
and who was admitted directly to such facility pursuant to article nine of this title
or section four hundred two of the correction law upon release or conditional release
from a correctional facility, provided that the provisions of this article shall not be
deemed to shorten or lengthen the time for which such person may be held pursuant
to such article or section respectively; or
(6) A person who has been determined to be a sex offender requiring civil management
pursuant to this article.
N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 10.03(g) (McKinney 2011). A “sex offense” is defined in section
10.03(p):
“Sex offense” means an act or acts constituting: (1) any felony defined in article one
hundred thirty of the penal law, including a sexually motivated felony; (2) patronizing
a prostitute in the first degree as defined in section 230.06 of the penal law, incest in
the second degree as defined in section 255.26 of the penal law, or incest in the first
degree as defined in section 255.27 of the penal law; (3) a felony attempt or conspiracy
to commit any of the foregoing offenses set forth in this subdivision; or (4) a designated
felony, as defined in subdivision (f) of this section, if sexually motivated and committed
prior to the effective date of this article.
Id. § 10.03(p).

33.

Id. § 10.01. For an explanation of confinement and strict and intensive supervision, see infra notes
36–43 and accompanying text.
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collateral, they are so important that their nondisclosure rendered the plea
proceedings fundamentally unfair.”34 The Court of Appeals determined that the trial
court’s failure to inform Harnett that he would be subject to the provisions of
SOMTA and face potential civil confinement or strict and intensive supervision
upon his conviction for the crime of sexual abuse in the first degree did not
automatically invalidate his plea.35
Specifically, SOMTA proceedings provide that multidisciplinary staff conduct a
preliminary review of a detained sex offender prior to his release from prison in order
to determine if the respondent should be referred to a case review team for further
evaluation.36 The multidisciplinary staff can use the detained sex offender’s records,
including his criminal history and details of the sex offense that constituted his sex
offense.37 Upon referral, the case review team can also review the same records in
order to determine if the detained sex offender requires civil management.38 Civil
management includes being either placed in a “secure treatment facility” operated by
the Office of Mental Health or put under strict and intensive supervision and
treatment by the Division of Parole and the Office of Mental Health within the
community.39 The New York attorney general may also elect to file a sex offender
civil management petition in the respective court.40 If the case review team
recommends civil management or the attorney general files a civil management
petition, the supreme court or county court conducts a hearing without a jury to
“determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the respondent is a sex
offender requiring civil management.”41 If probable cause exists, the same court will
“conduct a jury trial to determine whether the respondent is a detained sex offender

34. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 248.
35.

Id. at 203.

36. Mental Hyg. § 10.05(d).
37.

Id.

38. Id. § 10.05(c) –(e).
39.

See DOCS Fact Sheet: SOMTA/Civil Management, State of N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. Servs. (Dec. 2007),
http://www.doccs.ny.gov/FactSheets/PDF/somta.pdf [hereinafter DOCS Fact Sheet]. A “secure
treatment facility” is defined in section 10.03(o) as
a facility or a portion of a facility, designated by the commissioner, that may include a
facility located on the grounds of a correctional facility, that is staffed with personnel
from the office of mental health or the office . . . for people with developmental
disabilities for the purposes of providing care and treatment to persons confined under
this article, and persons defined in paragraph five of subdivision (g) of this section.
Personnel from these same agencies may provide security services, provided that such
staff are adequately trained in security methods and so equipped as to minimize the risk
or danger of escape.
Mental Hyg. § 10.03(o).

40. Id. § 10.06(a). This must include “[a] statement or statements alleging facts of an evidentiary character

tending to support the allegation that the respondent is a sex offender requiring civil management.” Id.
41.

Id. § 10.06(g), (k).
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who suffers from a ‘mental abnormality’” based on “clear and convincing evidence”42
and, if so, the court will consider “whether the respondent is a dangerous sex offender
requiring confinement or a sex offender requiring strict and intensive supervision.”43
First, the Court of Appeals found Harnett’s argument that SOMTA proceedings
are a direct consequence “without merit” because being subjected to SOMTA
proceedings was a collateral, not a direct, consequence of Harnett’s guilty plea.44
Second, the Court of Appeals determined that the case on which Harnett relied in
asserting his fairness argument was distinguishable from his case because Harnett
did not put forth facts on the record that indicated there was any “significant
likelihood” that he would be subject to confinement under SOMTA proceedings.45
In concluding that being subjected to SOMTA proceedings was a collateral
consequence of his plea, the Court of Appeals first observed that courts are required
to disclose direct consequences of guilty pleas to defendants, but are not obligated to
disclose collateral consequences.46 The Court of Appeals defined direct consequences
as “those that have a ‘definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on defendant’s
punishment.’ Consequences that are ‘peculiar to the individual’s personal
circumstances and . . . not within the control of the court system’ have been held to
be collateral.”47 The Court of Appeals looked to its decision in People v. Gravino for
guidance on what constitutes a collateral consequence.48 In Gravino, the New York
Court of Appeals held that the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) was
collateral.49 Drawing analogies between SOMTA and SORA, the court in Harnett
reasoned that both were civil statutes “designed to prevent a future crime,” not penal
statutes designed to punish a past crime, and that both SOMTA and SORA involved
42.

Id. § 10.07(a). “The jury, or the court if a jury trial is waived [by respondent], shall determine by clear
and convincing evidence whether the respondent . . . suffers from a mental abnormality. . . . A
determination . . . must be by unanimous verdict.” Id. §10.07(d). The respondent is released if a
unanimous verdict is not reached. If the jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict, a second trial is
scheduled and the same procedure is followed. Id. § 10.07(e).

43.

Id. §10.07(f).
If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent has a mental
abnormality involving such a strong predisposition to commit sex offenses, and such an
inability to control behavior, that the respondent is likely to be a danger to others and to
commit sex offenses . . . , the respondent shall be committed to a secure treatment
facility for care, treatment, and control until such time as he or she no longer requires
confinement.
Id.

44. People v. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d 200, 205–06 (2011).
45.

Id. at 206–07.

46. Id. at 205.
47.

Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 397, 403 (1995)).

48. Id. at 206.
49. Id.; People v. Gravino, 14 N.Y.3d 546 (2010). SORA requires sex offenders, as defined as “any person

who is convicted of ” certain sex offenses identified in the statute, to register as a sex offender. See N.Y.
Correct. Law § 168-a (McKinney 2011).
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“decisions and recommendations . . . made, after the time of a guilty plea, by
administrative agencies not under the court’s control.”50 The Court of Appeals also
reasoned that SOMTA was not an “automatic” consequence of a defendant’s guilty
plea because the majority of sex offenders ultimately are not found to be subjected to
SOMTA’s consequences of civil confinement and intensive supervision.51 To support
this contention, the Court of Appeals considered statistics from a 2010 report that
found that approximately “six percent of those detained sex offenders . . . were or
were likely to be subjected to civil confinement” under SOMTA.52 Therefore, the
Court of Appeals concluded that the consequences of SOMTA are collateral and not
direct.53
Second, the Court of Appeals considered whether “fundamental fairness”
nevertheless warranted a reversal.54 The court analogized Harnett’s situation to that
of the defendant in State v. Bellamy, in which the New Jersey Supreme Court held
“that fundamental fairness requires that prior to accepting a plea to a predicate
offense, the trial court must inform a defendant of the possible consequences under
the [Sexually Violent Predator] Act.”55 In Bellamy, the defendant had served a
significant portion of his sentence for a sex crime at the time of his guilty plea, with
only a short time remaining before his release.56 A week before he was released,
however, he discovered that he was going to be civilly committed under New Jersey’s
Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), a statute similar to SOMTA.57 The Bellamy
court found that the SVPA was collateral because the legislative intent was regulatory,
not punitive, and the consequences of the statute did not “automatically flow from
the conviction.”58 Despite this finding, the Bellamy court concluded that
fundamental fairness requires that the trial court inform a defendant of the
possible consequences under the Act. A defendant who has committed a
predicate offense may be faced with commitment under the Act for a period
in excess of his or her sentence. [New Jersey rules] require[] the court to
determine whether a defendant clearly understands “the nature of the charge
and the consequences of the plea.”59

50. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 206 (citation omitted).
51.

Id.

52.

Id. at 205 (citing N.Y. State Office of the Att’y Gen., A Report on the 2007 Law That
Established Civil Management for Sex Offenders in New York State (2010), http://www.
ag.ny.gov/bureaus/sexual_offender/pdfs/April2010YearlyReport.pdf).

53.

Id. at 206.

54. Id. at 206–08.
55.

Id.; State v. Bellamy, 835 A.2d 1231 (N.J. 2003).

56. Bellamy, 835 A.2d at 1234.
57.

Id. at 1233–35; see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-27.24 (West 2011).

58. Bellamy, 835 A.2d at 1237–38.
59.

Id. at 1238.
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In Harnett, the Court of Appeals distinguished Bellamy from Harnett’s case,
observing that, unlike the defendant in Bellamy, Harnett has not been “made the
subject of a SOMTA proceeding,” and that he did not put forth facts on the record
that indicated that there was any “significant likelihood that that would occur.”60
The Court of Appeals noted that notions of fairness provide that some pleas may be
entered into “involuntarily” because, whether collateral or not, the consequences of
the plea may be “of such great importance to [the defendant] that he would have
made a different decision had that consequence been disclosed.”61
Based on this reasoning, the Court of Appeals concluded that SOMTA is a
collateral consequence to Harnett’s plea, and the facts did not suggest that
fundamental fairness was at risk here.62 The Court of Appeals, therefore, affirmed
the Third Department’s decision holding that Harnett’s plea agreement was valid.63
The dissent, however, disagreed with the majority on several grounds.64 First, the
dissent found that the consequences of SOMTA, which could result in confinement
longer than a defendant’s prison term, may constitute “potentially greater
deprivation[s] of liberty than the criminal sentence imposed,” making it more like a
direct consequence.65 Second, the dissent argued that trial courts have “a constitutional
obligation to ensure that a defendant has a ‘full understanding of what the plea
connotes and its consequences. [D]ue process requires that the record must be clear
that the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative
courses of action open to the defendant.’”66 The dissent also contended that, while
SOMTA may be a collateral consequence, a defendant cannot “knowingly and
voluntarily” waive his “right to a trial if he does not know the full extent of
confinement that might result from his conviction.”67 Third, the dissent disagreed
with the majority’s logic that disclosure is not required simply because SOMTA
proceedings take place under a separate administrative process.68 As the dissent
explained, this logic does not hold because it is the “initial conviction that determines
a defendant’s eligibility for that evaluative process”—that is, it is a defendant’s initial
conviction that triggers SOMTA proceedings.69 Fourth, the dissent also took issue
with the majority’s analysis of the probability that SOMTA’s civil confinement
provisions would be applied to Harnett.70 The dissent emphasized that “any chance
60. People v. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d 200, 207 (2011).
61.

Id. (quoting People v. Gravino, 14 N.Y.3d 546, 559 (2010)).

62. Id. at 206–08.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 208–10 (Ciparick, J., dissenting).
65.

Id. at 209 (citing People v. Harnett, 894 N.Y.S.2d 614 (3d Dep’t 2010)).

66. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 397, 402–03 (1995)).
67.

Id.

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 209–10.
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that a defendant will face further confinement as a result of his plea should be made
known to him at the time the plea is taken.”71 Therefore, consistent with Bellamy, the
dissent found that notions of “fundamental fairness require[] the defendant’s
knowledge of that consequence,” even though being subjected to SOMTA proceedings
is collateral.72
III. HARNETT COURT’S HOLDING CONTRAVENES CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS
REQUIREMENTS

The Court of Appeals’s holding that SOMTA proceedings are a collateral
consequence of entering a plea agreement to sexual offenses and, therefore, are not
required to be disclosed to criminal defendants, contravenes the constitutional
requirement under the Fifth Amendment that a defendant enter a plea knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily.73 This case comment makes three contentions. First,
the court incorrectly concluded that SOMTA was a collateral, not a direct,
consequence of entering a guilty plea to a sex offense because the court failed to
consider the language and intent of SOMTA, which provides that criminal and civil
proceedings for sex offenders are to follow an “integrated approach.”74 In so holding,
the court failed to sufficiently account for the close relationship between the criminal
and civil proceedings and underestimated the significance of statistical data regarding
the possibility of civil confinement or strict and intensive supervision for defendants
convicted of sex offenses. Further, the court relied upon Gravino to substantiate its
claim that being subject to the provisions of SOMTA is a collateral consequence that
can be readily distinguished from the case in Harnett.
Second, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla challenges the Harnett
court’s use of a categorical methodology for determining disclosures to criminal
defendants, raising important constitutional concerns regarding information that
must be made available to defendants to ensure that plea bargains are entered into
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Specifically, civil confinement and strict
and intensive supervision, like deportation in Padilla, are significant because they
deprive a defendant of his liberty. The Harnett court also did not properly apply
notions of fundamental fairness, as articulated in Bellamy, in deciding whether the
consequences under SOMTA of a guilty plea must be disclosed to Harnett.
IV. THE HARNETT COURT’S CONSEQUENTIAL ANALYSIS: DIRECT OR COLLATERAL?

In Harnett, the Court of Appeals concluded that SOMTA is a collateral
consequence because it is civil and not penal, it is administered by an agency separate

71.

Id. at 209 n.1 (emphasis added).

72. Id. at 209–10 .
73. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243–44 (1969).
74.

N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 10.01(a) (McKinney 2011).
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from the courts, and its application to Harnett was “far from automatic.”75 The Court
of Appeals failed to properly consider the language and purpose of SOMTA.
A. Legislative Intent: The State’s “Integrated Approach”
It is well settled that New York courts find that “the statutory text . . . is the
clearest indicator of legislative purpose.” 76 Contrary to the Court of Appeals’s
findings, the language of SOMTA makes clear that the legislature did not intend for
the criminal and civil process to be separate and distinct as applied to sex offenders.77
SOMTA section 10.01(a) states that
recidivistic sex offenders pose a danger to society that should be addressed
through comprehensive programs of treatment and management. Civil and
criminal processes have distinct but overlapping goals, and both should be part
of an integrated approach that is based on evolving scientific understanding,
flexible enough to respond to current needs of individual offenders, and
sufficient to provide meaningful treatment and to protect the public.78

The goal of SOMTA is clear—to protect society from sex offenders who might
commit offenses again.79 The method by which SOMTA reaches this goal is an
“integrated approach” between the civil and criminal proceedings.80
The ordinary meaning of the term “integrated” sheds light on how a court should
interpret the term “integrated approach.” Integrated means: “Combined into a whole;
united; undivided. Also of a personality in which the component elements combine
harmoniously. . . . Or [u]niting in one system several constituents previously regarded
as separate.”81 With respect to this “integrated approach,” SOMTA section 10.01(e)
further states that, “[i]deally, effective risk assessment should begin to occur prior to
sentencing in the criminal process, and it should guide the process of civil
commitment.”82 By failing to analyze the language of the statute, the plain meaning
of “integrated,” and its use within section 10.01(e) of SOMTA, the Court of Appeals
ignored the legislature’s intent that criminal and civil proceedings involving SOMTA
should be united “in one system.”83

75. See Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 206.
76. In re M.B., 6 N.Y.3d 437, 447 (2006).
77.

Mental Hyg. § 10.01(a)–(b).

78. Id. § 10.01(a) (emphasis added).
79. S. 3318 (N.Y. 2007), 2007 Legis. Bill Hist. N.Y. S.B. 3318 (LEXIS) (sponsor’s memorandum in

support).
80. Mental Hyg. § 10.01(a).
81.

Oxford English Dictionary 1065 (2d ed. 1989).

82. Mental Hyg. § 10.01(e) (emphasis added).
83. See supra notes 76–82 and accompanying text.
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B. Gravino Is Distinguishable from Harnett
In taking a categorical approach to SOMTA, the Court of Appeals also incorrectly
relied on its prior holding in Gravino. 84 The Gravino court concluded that a
defendant’s guilty plea was valid despite the fact that she was not informed of SORA
prior to entering her plea because SORA was a collateral consequence.85 Gravino
contended that “her guilty plea was involuntary because the judge did not tell her
that she would have to register as a sex offender” until after she entered her guilty
plea and was sentenced.86 She contended that SORA was a direct consequence of her
guilty plea due to the significance of “the ramifications of being identified as a sex
offender.”87 The court found that SORA was civil in nature and not part of the penal
phase of sentencing.88 Similarly, the Harnett court reasoned that SOMTA is a civil,
not penal, statute “designed to prevent future crime,” and that SOMTA relies on
administrative agencies outside a court’s control.89 SORA and SOMTA, however,
are readily distinguishable from each other in two ways, thereby further challenging
the Court of Appeals’s reasoning.
First, the language of SOMTA clearly provides that the civil and criminal
proceedings are to follow an integrated approach.90 The language that the legislature
chose for SORA, however, does not include or reference any type of relationship
between the civil and penal phase of a defendant’s proceedings.91 Second, in contrast
to SORA, SOMTA involves the potential for a defendant’s liberty to be taken away
from him indefinitely.92 While a released sex offender is required to register with
state authorities pursuant to SORA’s requirements93 and, as a result, may suffer
difficulties matriculating into society because of the public stigma associated with
such registration, his liberty has not been taken away from him.94 The Court of
Appeals’s failure to acknowledge these critical differences between the two statutes

84. People v. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d 200, 205–06 (2011).
85. People v. Gravino, 14 N.Y.3d 546, 554–59 (2010).
86. Id. at 551.
87.

Id. at 555–56.

88. Id. at 556.
89. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 206.
90. N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 10.01(a) (McKinney 2011).
91.

Compare N.Y. Correct. Law § 168 (McKinney 2011) (SORA does not use the term “integrate”), with
Mental Hyg. § 10.01(a) (“Civil and criminal processes have distinct but overlapping goals, and both
should be part of an integrated approach that is based on evolving scientific understanding, f lexible
enough to respond to current needs of individual offenders, and sufficient to provide meaningful
treatment and to protect the public.” (emphasis added)).

92.

Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 208–09 (Ciparick, J., dissenting).

93.

See id. at 203–06 (majority opinion).

94. See generally People v. Gravino, 14 N.Y.3d 546 (2010).
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further calls into question the court’s reliance on Gravino in holding that confinement
under SOMTA is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea to a sex offense.95
C. Treatment and the Criminal-Civil Relationship
SOMTA provides that the criminal justice system should offer sex offenders
appropriate treatment while incarcerated.96 By ignoring the language and legislative
intent of SOMTA, the court overlooked the relationship between the sex offender
treatment administered while the defendant is incarcerated within the criminal
system and the outcome of the civil proceedings under SOMTA. Such a relationship
further supports the contention that consequences of the civil proceedings under
SOMTA are not separate and independent from the criminal proceedings.97
According to the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) Sex
Offender Counseling and Treatment Guidelines,
[t]he Department supports and conducts sex offender counseling and
treatment programs under the premise that sex offenders can change and that
sexual re-offending behavior can be reduced through counseling and
treatment. If an inmate is referred for review under Mental Hygiene Law,
Article 10, successful completion of the [Sex Offender Counseling and
Treatment Program] will be considered during the evaluations which take
place as part of that process and may be viewed as a factor in the inmate’s favor
regarding the need for civil management.98

The objectives of sex offender treatment are to reduce the likelihood of recidivism
and protect the public.99 Although New York State admits that there are mixed
results regarding the effectiveness of treatment, it notes important lessons, including
that “treatment can be successful if it is geared toward the type of abuse and reasons
behind it.”100 Furthermore, “SOMTA significantly enhanced the caliber of the
treatment programs DOCS must provide to all sex offenders . . . . The expanded
programs must aim to reduce the likelihood of reoffending by helping those inmates
to control the chain of their own behavior that leads to sexual offending.”101
Pursuant to SOMTA, the treatment a sex offender receives while incarcerated is
included in the relevant records used by the multidisciplinary staff in determining

95. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 206.
96. Mental Hyg. § 10.01(f).
97.

See id.

98. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., Sex Offender Counseling and Treatment Program

Guidelines 1, 5 (2008) [hereinafter Guidelines] (emphasis added), http://www.docs.state.ny.us/
ProgramServices/SOCTP_Guidelines_Nov08.pdf.
99. Mental Hyg. § 10.01(a)–(f).
100. “Myths and Facts” Current Research on Managing Sex Offenders April 2008, N.Y. State Division of Crim.

Just. Services, http://criminaljustice.ny.gov/nsor/som_mythsandfacts.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2011).
101. DOCS Fact Sheet, supra note 39, at 1–2.
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whether a sex offender should be recommended to the case review team.102 The case
review team is also permitted to use this information in determining whether civil
management should be recommended.103
The fact that the treatment a sex offender receives during the criminal phase is
used by the multidisciplinary staff in determining whether the respondent should be
referred to a case review team, as well as used by the case review team to determine
whether the respondent requires civil management, illustrates the integrated
relationship between civil and criminal proceedings. A defendant’s progress, or lack
thereof, during treatment while criminally incarcerated, therefore, inf luences
recommendations for civil management after incarceration.104 Though the treatment
a defendant receives during the penal phase may not be under the control of the
court, the Court of Appeals failed to account for the interrelationship between the
criminal proceedings and civil proceedings due to this treatment. Furthermore, this
interrelationship is consistent with the legislative intent of SOMTA to provide an
“integrated approach” to the “[c]ivil and criminal processes.”105 Accordingly, the
criminal proceedings have a direct impact on the civil proceedings under SOMTA.106
Also, although confinement or intensive and strict supervision that ultimately
may be required under SOMTA proceedings are peculiar to the individual, SOMTA’s
text makes clear that all detained sex offenders are automatically subject to the
provisions of SOMTA and, thus, the possibility of indefinite civil confinement.107 In
addition to receiving treatment during incarceration, these provisions require that
DOCS notify the New York State Office of Mental Health (OMH) of the
respondent’s pending discharge from prison.108 DOCS then discloses all of the
respondent’s relevant records to the multidisciplinary staff and case review team,
including sex treatment he received while incarcerated.109 The OMH interviews the
respondent to determine the offender’s dangerousness, with civil confinement and
102. Mental Hyg. § 10.05(d) (“[S]uch staff shall review and assess relevant medical, clinical, criminal, or

institutional records, actuarial risk assessment instruments or other records and reports, including
records and reports provided by the district attorney of the county where the person was convicted.”).
103. Id. § 10.05(e) (“Upon such referral, the case review team shall review relevant records, including those

described in subdivisions (c) and (d) of this section.”).
104. Id. § 10.05(d) (“[S]uch staff shall review and assess relevant medical, clinical, criminal, or institutional

records, actuarial risk assessment instruments or other records and reports, including records and
reports provided by the district attorney of the county where the person was convicted.”); id. § 10.05(e)
(“Upon such referral, the case review team shall review relevant records, including those described in
subdivisions (c) and (d) of this section.”).
105. Id. § 10.01(a).
106. See id. § 10.01(a)–(g); Guidelines, supra note 98, at 5.
107. Mental Hyg. § 10.05(b) (“When it appears to an agency with jurisdiction that a person who may be a

detained sex offender is nearing an anticipated release from confinement, the agency shall give notice of
that fact to the attorney general and to the commissioner of mental health.”); DOCS Fact Sheet, supra
note 39.
108. See DOCS Fact Sheet, supra note 39.
109. See id.
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strict and intensive supervision as possible consequences of the OMH’s evaluation
process.110 Given the litany of treatments, disclosures, and procedures sex offenders
submit to when they have been convicted of, or have entered a guilty plea for, a sex
offense, it is difficult to see how the Court of Appeals could find that the majority of
detained sex offenders “will suffer no consequences from that designation at all.”111
Further, consistent with the dissent’s position, it is the “initial conviction that
determines a defendant’s eligibility” for SOMTA.112 Therefore, the interrelationship
between the criminal and civil proceedings demonstrates the flaw in the Court of
Appeals’ oversimplification; that is, because SOMTA proceedings are directed under
a separate administrative process, they are collateral.113
D. Civil Confinement Statistics
In addition to failing to consider the interrelationship between the criminal and
civil proceedings, the Court of Appeals, in concluding that “the consequences of a
defendant’s plea are far from automatic,” underestimated the significance of data
collected monthly by the Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS).114 Specifically,
the DCJS tracks the number of detained sex offenders referred to case review teams
and recommended for civil management, shedding important light on what
ramifications are truly at stake for detained sex offenders.115 The data the Court of
Appeals referred to was collected by the Office of Sex Offender Management in the
DCJS and supports the view that SOMTA is a direct consequence of a sex offense
conviction.116 According to the DCJS, since April 2007, 13.2% of detained sex
offenders reviewed by the multidisciplinary staff at the OMH were referred to a case
review team.117 Of the detained sex offenders recommended to a case review team,
almost 45% were subsequently recommended for civil management, or 5.7% of the
total number who were referred to OMH for review.118 In other words, a defendant
convicted of a sex offense that subjects him to SOMTA has a 5.7% chance of being
110. See id.
111. People v. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d 200, 206 (2011).
112. Id. at 209 (Cipatrick, J., dissenting).
113. See id. at 205–06 (majority opinion).
114. Id. at 206; State of N.Y., Div. of Criminal Justice Servs., Evaluation and Processing of Cases,

Mar. 13, 2007 Through Dec. 31, 2011 (2011) [hereinafter Evaluation and Processing of Cases]
(on file with author).
115. Evaluation and Processing of Cases, supra note 114
116. Id.
117. Id.; N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 10.05(d) (McKinney 2011) (In addition to reviewing relevant records,

including medical, clinical, criminal, and institutional, the case review team can order a psychiatric
examination of the inmate to use in its determination of whether a detainee should be recommended for
civil management); see also id. § 10.05(e) (“Upon such referral, the case review team shall review relevant
records, including those described in subdivisions (c) and (d) of this section, and may arrange for a
psychiatric examination of the respondent.”).
118. Evaluation and Processing of Cases, supra note 114.
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recommended for civil management, which includes either civil confinement or strict
or intensive supervision, upon release from incarceration.119
In concluding that “experience to date indicates that the large majority of people
who are ‘detained sex offenders’ as SOMTA defines the term will suffer no
consequences from that designation at all,” the Court of Appeals ignored the fact
that almost 6 out of every 100 convicted sex offenders in New York could be
perpetually confined or subjected to intensive and strict supervision for life after
serving an incarcerated sentence as a result of SOMTA’s civil management
provisions.120 When a defendant enters a guilty plea, he is making a bargain: he is
waiving “a number of valuable constitutional rights in order to obtain reasonable
assurance of certainty rather than gamble the possibility of a not guilty verdict
against the heavier punishment, the greater anxiety and, in some cases at least, the
greater expense, involved in a full trial.”121 The greater this “assurance of certainty is
diluted,” the greater “the bargaining process becomes less acceptable to defendants.”122
A 5.7% likelihood, therefore, would certainly weigh heavily in a defendant’s calculus
of choosing the certainty afforded by a plea bargain or taking the chance at trial.123
When a defendant enters a plea bargain not knowing that there is a 5.7% likelihood
119. Id.; see also DOCS Fact Sheet, supra note 39.

For those offenders determined by the case review team to have a mental abnormality
that predisposes them to commit new sex offenses, the Attorney General’s Office files
petitions that seek civil management through a process of establishing probable cause
and taking the case to a jury. If a jury concurs with the belief that the sex offender may
pose a threat to society, the judge can then decide whether to confine the offender at an
OMH-operated secure facility or place the offender under [strict and intensive
supervision and treatment] in the community.
Id.
120. People v. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d 200, 206 (2011). “By pleading guilty, defendant exposed himself to the

possibility that he would be confined after expiration of his prison sentence, perhaps indefinitely.” Id. at
210 (Cipatrick, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also State v. Suggs, 920 N.Y.S.2d 644, 647 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. Count y 2011) (“‘Involuntar y civil conf inement [pursuant to Article 10] may
entail indefinite confinement, [which] could be a more intrusive exercise of state power than
incarceration following a criminal conviction’” (alterations in original) (quoting Mental Hygiene Legal
Serv. v. Spitzer, No. 07 Civ. 2935 (GEL), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85163, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16,
2007), aff ’d sub nom. Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v. Paterson, No. 07-5548-cv, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS
4942 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 2009))); People v. Nieves, 896 N.Y.S.2d 644, 649 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2010)
(“Article 10 of the Mental Hygiene Law, enacted by the Legislature in 2007, authorizes certain
convicted sex offenders to be subject to indefinite civil confinement in a secure mental health facility
or indefinite strict and intensive supervision and treatment in the community upon a finding by a jury
that such an offender suffers from a ‘Mental Abnormality’ as defined by the statute.”).
121. People v. McConnell, 49 N.Y.2d 340, 346 (1980).
122. Id.
123. It is also important to note that the DCJS does not track these statistics by the specific sex offense. See

Evaluation and Processing of Cases, supra note 114. Such data might be very relevant for a
respondent to determine whether there is an increased probability of civil confinement or strict and
intensive supervision based on the specific sex offense to which they are admitting guilt. This data
would also be suggestive of a consequential relationship solely associated with a particular sex offense
and the potential for civil confinement.
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that he will be recommended for civil management, the benefits of the bargain
between the defendant and the criminal justice system have been significantly
compromised to the detriment of both parties.
V. LIMITATIONS ON THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH: PADILLA V. KENTUCKY AND
STATE V. BELLAMY

A. Padilla v. Kentucky
Aside from whether SOMTA is a direct consequence of pleading guilty to a sex
offense and therefore mandates disclosure, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2010 holding in
Padilla v. Kentucky raises concerns about the New York Court of Appeals’s categorical
approach in Harnett as well as highlights the constitutional and policy arguments in
favor of mandating disclosure of SOMTA.124 The defendant in Padilla claimed that
his counsel did not inform him, before he entered a guilty plea, that deportation was
a consequence of his conviction and that, had he been so informed, he would have
chosen to go to trial.125 In a prior proceeding, the Supreme Court of Kentucky ruled
against the defendant, holding that “the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective
assistance of counsel does not protect a criminal defendant from erroneous advice
about deportation because it is merely a ‘collateral’ consequence of his conviction.”126
Reversing the Supreme Court of Kentucky, the U.S. Supreme Court observed that,
124. It is important to note that in concluding that SOMTA was a collateral consequence, the court relied on

People v. Ford, a New York case that concluded that defendants who may be deported after serving their
sentences do not have a right to disclosure of deportation consequences. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 205
(citing to People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 397 (1995)). The court’s reliance is misplaced given the U.S.
Supreme Court’s more recent holding in Padilla, which effectively overruled Ford. See Padilla v.
Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010). In Padilla, the Supreme Court concluded that the consequences
of deportation for a defendant are so severe that attorneys must disclose deportation to their clients prior
to them entering a guilty plea. Id. The New York Court of Appeals’ dependence in Harnett on Ford calls
into question the foundation of the majority’s holding that SOMTA is collateral. Notably, the New York
Court of Appeals also referenced Padilla in the context that a defendant could argue a plea was made
involuntarily if he was not informed about SOMTA, the likelihood of being confined under SOMTA
was realistic, and such knowledge would have changed his decision to enter a guilty plea.
But since SOMTA consequences can include extended confinement, a plea made in
ignorance of such consequences may sometimes be proved involuntary—if a defendant
can show that the prospect of SOMTA confinement was realistic enough that it
reasonably could have caused him, and in fact would have caused him, to reject an
otherwise acceptable plea bargain. Of course, in such cases the defendant will have to
prove that he did not know about SOMTA—i.e., that his lawyer did not tell him about
it—before he pleaded guilty. Thus, the issue of whether the plea was voluntary may be
closely linked to the question of whether a defendant received the effective assistance of
counsel.
Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 207 (citing Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1473). However, the court found that this was
not the case with this defendant. “On this record, we do not know either whether his lawyer told him
about SOMTA or whether, considering the facts of defendant’s situation, SOMTA would have been a
significant factor in the evaluation of a plea bargain.” Id. at 207–08.
125. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478.
126. Id.
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although deportation is an entirely civil process, it is “intimately related to the criminal
process” and carries consequences that are “particularly severe.”127 In Padilla, the
Court held that the “longstanding Sixth Amendment precedents, the seriousness of
deportation as a consequence of a criminal plea, and the concomitant impact of
deportation on families . . . demand no less” than disclosing that entering a guilty plea
“carries the risk of deportation.”128 It held that this classification is thus “ill-suited”
because the nature of this intimate relationship makes deportation “uniquely difficult
to classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence.”129
The Court also observed that the immigration statute at hand was “succinct, clear,
and explicit in defining the removal consequence” for the defendant.130 In this context,
the Court held that even when the specific deportation consequences for a particular
defendant are not clear, attorneys must at least advise their clients “that pending
criminal charges may carry adverse immigration consequences.”131 This holding is
consistent with the policy consideration underlying plea bargains: establishing
disclosures and creating a “full record” gives the defendant certainty in the plea
bargaining process as well as supports the integrity of the criminal justice proceedings.132
The Court’s reasoning in Padilla suggests two important limitations on applying
Harnett’s direct-versus-collateral categorical approach.133 First, a categorical approach
127. Id. at 1481.
128. Id. at 1486.
129. Id. at 1481–82.
130. Id. at 1483 (“In the instant case, the terms of the relevant immigration statute are succinct, clear, and

explicit in defining the removal consequence for Padilla’s conviction.”).
131. Id. at 1483, 1485.
132. People v. McConnell, 49 N.Y.2d 340, 346 (1980) (“[T]he importance of a full record so that defendant

will understand that he can rely on what is stated on the record, within the limitations stated, and
cannot under any but the most unusual circumstances rely on anything not stated on the record no
matter what discussion there has been.”).
133. Padilla also established an important constitutional position regarding the Sixth Amendment on which

Harnett briefly acknowledged, but did not elaborate. See People v. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d 200 (2011). The
Supreme Court asserted that the classification of direct or collateral consequences is “ill-suited” with
respect to the guarantee of effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Padilla, 130 S.
Ct. at 1476. This assertion creates an important paradox against the backdrop of the Harnett decision.
In determining that deportation must be disclosed to defendants by their attorney pursuant to the Sixth
Amendment as measured under the first-prong of the Strickland test, the Supreme Court implicitly
established that such disclosures must also be made under the Fifth Amendment’s requirements of due
process. Id. at 1477. The first prong of the Strickland test is measured by whether or not the defendant
received “reasonable professional assistance” from his or her attorney. See Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 688, 694–95 (1984) (this is a highly deferential standard by which courts are to apply a wide
latitude to attorneys). Applying this highly deferential standard in Padilla, the Supreme Court
determined that attorneys must make disclosures regarding deportation to their clients prior to the
entry of a guilty plea. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. Under such a rationale, it is plausible that the
Supreme Court effectively imputed such disclosures to the Fifth Amendment’s requirements of
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering a guilty plea. See N.Y. Crim. Prac. § 12.07(5) (2d ed.
2010). In noting Padilla’s holding regarding the Sixth Amendment, Harnett opened the door to
imputing constitutional due process requirements for SOMTA disclosures.
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may be inappropriate where the civil processes and consequences are intimately
related to the criminal. Consistent with Padilla’s observation of the relationship
between a criminal conviction and deportation proceedings, the criminal and civil
proceedings to which Harnett is subject under SOMTA are “intimately related.” The
classification of a civil management consequence as either direct or collateral is
therefore “ill-suited.” But, as noted by the dissent in Harnett, all detained sex
offenders are subject to SOMTA, with a 5.7% likelihood of being subjected to
indefinite civil confinement or intensive and strict supervision.134 SOMTA also
states specifically that the criminal and civil proceedings are integrated processes
and that the treatment a defendant receives during the penal phase can influence the
outcome of the civil proceedings.135 Like deportation, SOMTA is therefore “‘most
difficult’ to divorce the penalty from the conviction.”136 In this respect, Harnett’s
finding that the criminal and civil proceedings are “not under the court’s control” is
inapposite under Padilla.137
Second, Padilla challenges using a categorical approach when the language of the
statute spells out very clear consequences.138 The Court in Padilla emphasized that
the deportation statute in question was “succinct, clear, and explicit” with respect to
“the removal consequences for Padilla’s conviction.”139 Similarly, SOMTA’s language
is “succinct, clear, and explicit” with respect to the process by which a sex offender is
subject under SOMTA.140 SOMTA clearly states that sex offenders are generally
subject to SOMTA and also defines and outlines the procedures, circumstances, and
standards under which a convicted defendant is subject to civil confinement or strict
and intensive supervision.141 Therefore, in applying a categorical approach to
determine that SOMTA need not be disclosed to defendants, Harnett ignored the
critical limitations in using such an approach emphasized by Padilla.142
134. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 208 (Ciparick, J., dissenting) (Though the dissent found that SOMTA was a

collateral consequence, it stated: “I dissented in Gravino on the ground that because imposition of
SORA registration is mandatory and known at the time of the plea, it ought to be considered a direct
consequence of that plea. This rationale likewise applies to defendant’s automatic eligibility for SOMTA
review. All defendants convicted of sexual abuse in the first degree and sentenced to a prison term are
‘detained sex offenders’ under SOMTA. The statute requires that the Attorney General and
Commissioner of Mental Health receive notice of a detained sex offender’s scheduled release date and
provides the authority to take further action towards civil management, if warranted.” (citations
omitted)); See also N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law §§ 10.01, 10.03(g) (McKinney 2011).
135. Mental Hyg. § 10.01(a).
136. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481 (citation omitted).
137. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 206.
138. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See generally N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law §§ 10.01, 10.05–10.07 (McKinney 2011).
142. Relying on Padilla, Harnett stated that had the defendant put forth on the record that he was not

informed of SOMTA, there was a realistic likelihood he would have been confined under SOMTA,
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Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court’s recognition of the significant consequences
of deportation not only further supports the limitations of using a categorical
approach for disclosure, but also raises important issues regarding an individual’s
constitutionally protected liberty at stake.143 Like deportation, the potential
consequences of SOMTA, including indefinite strict supervision or civil confinement,
can be equally as devastating as deportation because an individual’s liberty is being
taken away without due process.144
Finally, in Harrett the Court of Appeals’s reliance on Padilla in finding that a
defendant who can put forth on the record that he did not know about SOMTA,
that there was a “realistic” chance that he would be subject to confinement, and that
such knowledge would have caused him to not enter a plea bargain is misplaced.145
The court stated,
But since SOMTA consequences can include extended confinement, a plea
made in ignorance of such consequences may sometimes be proved
involuntary—if a defendant can show that the prospect of SOMTA
confinement was realistic enough that it reasonably could have caused him,
and in fact would have caused him, to reject an otherwise acceptable plea
bargain. Of course, in such cases the defendant will have to prove that he did
not know about SOMTA—i.e., that his lawyer did not tell him about it—
before he pleaded guilty. Thus, the issue of whether the plea was voluntary
may be closely linked to the question of whether a defendant received the
effective assistance of counsel.146

This rationale not only overlooks Padilla’s observations about why the categorical
approach is “ill-suited” in certain situations, but also puts convicted sex offenders
subject to SOMTA in a paradoxical position: after defendants have served their time,
they would need to establish that SOMTA was not disclosed to them, that
“confinement was realistic enough” under SOMTA at the time of their conviction,
and that they would have rejected the plea bargain.147 This logic is flawed for several
reasons. First, it creates inefficiencies within the judicial process because defendants
would need to contend that their due process rights were violated after they have
served their time. Second, the Court of Appeals does not define or elaborate on what
“realistic enough” means, putting defendants, their attorneys, and the courts in the
highly subjective position of having to make this determination on a case-by-case
and this would have caused him to reject his guilty plea, he could have contended his right to due
process was violated. See Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 207 (citing Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1473).
143. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483.
144. See In re Civil Commitment of D.L., 797 A.2d 166, 173 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (“Confinement

. . . is theoretically without end. In that sense, it constitutes a greater liberty deprivation than that
imposed upon a criminal defendant who, in all but a handful of cases, is given a maximum release date.
A more onerous impairment of a person’s liberty interest is difficult to imagine.”).
145. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 206.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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basis. Third, the court limits the scope of SOMTA consequences to confinement
when, in fact, a defendant may consider strict and intensive supervision a severe
enough consequence that it might change his decision to enter a plea bargain. Finally,
as noted, SOMTA provides sex offenders treatment during the penal phase that can
influence the outcome of the proceedings under SOMTA.148 Thus, what may be
“realistic enough” when a defendant enters his guilty plea, may change in or against
his favor as he participates in sex treatment programs during the penal phase.
Therefore, with respect to this argument, Harnett’s logic is flawed.
B. State v. Bellamy
Regardless of whether SOMTA is a direct or a collateral consequence of a guilty
plea, Harnett also did not fully account for a further limitation on its holding: notions
of fundamental fairness, which implicate the integrity of the plea bargain process
and support the disclosure of civil consequences under SOMTA to criminal
defendants.149 Although Harnett presents a case of first impression for the New York
courts, State v. Bellamy comports with Padilla’s non-categorical approach in analyzing
the consequences of entering a plea agreement and therefore provides persuasive
authority.150
In Bellamy, the Supreme Court of New Jersey considered fundamental fairness
and the integrity of the plea bargain process in concluding that the potential
consequences for a convicted sex offender under the New Jersey Sexually Violent
Predator Act must be disclosed to defendants prior to their entry of a guilty plea.151
The New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that
when the consequences of a plea may be so severe that a defendant may be
confined for the remainder of his or her life, fundamental fairness demands
that the trial court inform defendant of that possible consequence. The failure
of either the court or defense counsel to inform defendant that a possible
consequence of a plea to a predicate offense under the Act is future
confinement for an indefinite period deprives that defendant of information
needed to make a knowing and voluntary plea.152

148. DOCS Fact Sheet, supra note 39.
149. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 207–08.
150. Compare State v. Bellamy, 835 A.2d 1231 (N.J. 2003) (“[I]t matters little if the consequences are called

indirect or collateral when in fact their impact is devastating.” (alteration in original) (quoting New
Jersey v. Heitzman, 527 A.2d 439, 441 (N.J. 1987) (Wilentz, C.J., dissenting)), with Padilla v. Kentucky,
130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010) (“Deportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction is, because of its
close connection to the criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral
consequence. The collateral versus direct distinction is thus ill-suited . . . .”). Also, the Bellamy court
went even further than mandating disclosure of the statute; it also determined that the decision would
be applied with limited retroactivity. Under a limited retroactive application, the new rule would apply
to any cases under direct review at the time the rule was announced. See Bellamy, 835 A.2d at 1238–39.
151. Bellamy, 835 A.2d at 1234, 1238–39.
152. Id. at 1238–39.
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Given the potential indefinite loss of liberty, Harnett underestimated the notions
of fairness that should be factored into the plea bargain process. Though Harnett
admittedly acknowledged that certain circumstances may exist where a collateral
consequence of a plea may be of such significance that it could offend due process if
not disclosed, it fell short of mandating the disclosure of SOMTA.
[The New York Court of Appeals] said in Gravino that “[t]here may be cases in
which a defendant can show that he pleaded guilty in ignorance of a consequence
that, although collateral for purposes of due process, was of such great
importance to him that he would have made a different decision had that
consequence been disclosed.” We observed that such cases would be “rare,”
because “in the vast majority of plea bargains the overwhelming consideration
for the defendant is whether he will be imprisoned and for how long.”153

Rather, Harnett appeared to shift the burden onto the defendant to show the
likelihood that SOMTA would apply. The Court of Appeals noted that “[i]t is not
asserted that this defendant has been made the subject of a SOMTA proceeding, and
we cannot tell on this record whether there is or ever was any significant likelihood
that that would occur.”154 This establishes an impossible feat for any sex offender
defendant who is disputing a plea agreement based on lack of disclosure of SOMTA.
The defendant would not know his own “likelihood” of being subjected to the
potentially severe consequences of SOMTA until after they have served their sentence
and the case review team makes its determination that the defendant requires strict
supervision or civil confinement.155 Given that Harnett only recently entered his plea
and has not yet fulfilled his prison sentence, and the case review team’s determination
has not been made with respect to him, the court holds him to an impossible task.156
By creating an insurmountable burden, Harnett misses the significance and essence
of the Bellamy holding—that is, when constitutional liberty is at stake, “fundamental
fairness demands that the trial court” make such disclosures to a defendant.157

153. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 206 (alteration in original) (citation omitted); People v. Gravino, 14 N.Y.3d 546

(2010).
154. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 207.
155. As previously noted, New York State does not track statistics on the type of sex offense relative to strict

supervision or civil confinement for sex offenders; therefore, it would be impossible for a defendant to
know whether or not he faces a greater likelihood of being subject to SOMTA when he enters his plea.
See supra note 123; see also N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 10.01(a) (McKinney 2011).
156. See supra note 155.
157. Bellamy, 835 A.2d at 1238; see also People v. Parker, 711 N.Y.S.2d 656, 661 (4th Dep’t 2000)

(“[I]mposition and enforcement of sentencing conditions must satisfy the requirements of due process
and ‘must not . . . amount to overreaching or a denial of a defendant’s entitlement to fundamental
fairness’” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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VI. CONCLUSION

The plain text and clear purpose of SOMTA illustrate that the legislature
intended SOMTA to be inextricably intertwined with the criminal process.158 The
Court of Appeals in Harnett, however, did not carefully examine the language or
purpose of SOMTA, which notes that the “[c]ivil and criminal processes . . . both
should be part of an integrated approach,” in reaching its conclusion that SOMTA is
a collateral consequence, and, therefore, need not be disclosed.159 Harnett also failed
to adequately account for the interrelationship between the criminal and civil
proceedings and, therefore, underestimated the importance of statistical data
regarding the possibility of civil confinement or strict and intensive supervision.
Further, the Harnett court’s reliance on Gravino in concluding that SOMTA was a
direct consequence is misplaced.
Padilla challenges the Harnett court’s categorical approach and highlights the
constitutional rights at stake in the context of mandating disclosures.160 By
questioning the efficacy of applying a categorical analysis to disclosures, the Court in
Padilla inherently challenges whether Harnett’s reliance on such a classification is, in
fact, valid.161 Consequences that are categorically similar to deportation under
Padilla’s rationale must be disclosed to defendants as part of the plea bargain
process—SOMTA certainly falls into such a category.162 The Padilla holding also
raises important constitutional issues regarding an individual’s liberty at stake in
relation to disclosures.
Furthermore, State v. Bellamy reinforces the limitations of using a categorical
approach by bringing into light the importance that fundamental fairness should
play in the court’s decision. Bellamy notably observed that the severity of consequences,
such as civil confinement, demand courts to provide such disclosures.163
The plea bargain process is a fundamental aspect of the criminal judicial
system.164 Plea bargains provide courts with the essential opportunity to customize
sentences to each defendant, expedite a defendant’s ability to begin the rehabilitation
process, reduce the expenses associated with clogged court dockets, and provide law
enforcement with an opportunity to barter leniency in exchange for valuable
information.165 Among all of its benefits, the plea bargain process most importantly
“serves an end to justice.”166 It is essential to plea bargains that notions of fairness are
inherent to the process to ensure that a defendant is not misinformed about the
158. See generally Mental Hyg. § 10.01.
159. Id. § 10.01(a); Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 204–05.
160. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. State v. Bellamy, 835 A.2d 1231, 1238 (N.J. 2003).
164. People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 229 (1974).
165. Id.
166. Id.
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agreement in which he is entering.167 The Court of Appeals’s holding in Harnett
establishes that defendants who enter guilty pleas are not required to know about
SOMTA, a statute that involves proceedings that could result in severe and
devastating consequences for a sex offender.168 Without such knowledge, defendants
are not able to accurately perform the calculus of weighing the certainty of
consequences in entering a guilty plea against the chances of going to trial. Such a
degree of certainty relies on the essential due process requirements of knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily entering a guilty plea.169 The Harnett decision offends
this notion of justice because justice truly cannot be obtained when critical
constitutional protections are compromised.170

167. Bellamy, 835 A.2d at 1235.
168. People v. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d 200, 207–08 (2011); Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010).
169. N.Y. Crim. Prac. § 12.07(5) (2d ed. 2010).
170. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d at 233–34.
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